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In this concluding chapter we return to the themes and questions raised in Chapter 1 and discuss those aspects of the parties and party systems on which the EU and processes of European integration, in the light of our theoretical expectations and the country chapters, have exercized or should have exercized, the most decisive impact. We then focus on four areas: changes in the fundamental characteristics of the party systems, the ideological transformation of parties and the role of European party federations in this process, the place of Euroscepticism in electoral competition, and the degree to which EU-related attitudes have received effective representation.
In terms of general conclusions and answers to the broad questions raised in Chapter 1 it seems that there has been little direct impact of the EU on the party systems of the new member states. The format of the party systems have been hardly affected, similarly to Western Europe (cf. Mair, 2000) . Integration proved to be, however, somewhat more consequential for the mechanics of party systems. As with Marks and Wilson (2000) , it may be concluded that 'Europe' has exerted an influence that is both pervasive and quite profound -but by no means direct.
With respect to the overall outcomes of EU involvement, too, there is little sign that 'populists and demagogues ' (Grzymała-Busse and Innes, 2003) have been significantly encouraged or that predictions of major instability have been borne out. There was, indeed, 248 pervasive governmental fallout throughout the region after the EP elections of 2004 -but it may be questioned, firstly, how far party or government unpopularity was linked with EU issues and, secondly, how negative the political repercussions actually were. The Czech government did, indeed, fall soon after the elections -but, as pointed out in Chapter 2, a new government was soon formed by the same parties and with most of the same ministers. In
Hungary the EP elections also led to the replacement of the prime minister and to conflict within the major governing party -but, as argued in Chapter 4, this might well produce the conditions for long-term government durability rather than presage persistent instability.
Broad populist parties and apparently extremist forces generally turned out to be quite restrained in their final response to EU accession and were often receptive to the political opportunities offered by EU membership. It may well be that it is the immediate preaccession period that provides the greatest opportunities for anti-EU forces -it was the 2001 elections that saw the rise of clearly Eurosceptic parties in Poland and those in Bulgaria during 2005 that saw the rise of the Ataka coalition described in Chapter 10. These may also be cases of the 'anticipated representation' discussed later in this chapter. But in general anti-EU parties have, as suggested in Chapter 1, tended to cluster on the margins of the party system or, if they have persisted and continued to show serious political ambitions, moderated their outlook and moved towards the political centre.
Neither does it seem to be the case that EU accession for the CEE countries has coincided with or caused any general crisis of their party systems (Ágh, 2005) . From the evidence of the post-accession elections there were indeed major shocks in Lithuania, with the eruption of the Labour Party, and in Slovenia, with the success of the Democratic Party and the relative failure of the Liberal Democracy. But neither of these developments could be readily linked with any EU influence (Chapters 6 and 9). The Labour Party (together with the Liberal Democrats and Agrarians in the same country) was one in a series of new Baltic parties to threaten the status quo, while Slovenia's Liberal Democracy had finally come to the end of a long period of political supremacy. The Polish elections of 2005 did indeed bring further elements of instability into play (Chapter 7), but this was hardly a novelty in the Polish context and was more occasioned by the near-total collapse of the political left in the domestic context than by any direct EU influence. Most chapters in this book, indeed, draw the explicit conclusion that the EU has so far had little direct influence on national party politics and that enlargement has equally had little direct political impact. But this is by no means the whole story, and there is a range of other ways in which the extent of EU influence on CEE party politics can be gauged. The first of these concerns the overall shape and composition of the national party system.
THE CHANGING BOUNDARIES AND STRUCTURES OF PARTY SYSTEMS
As anticipated (Lewis, 2005, p. 196 It is difficult to detect any robust EU impact on the consolidation or destabilization of party systems. In Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Latvia there seems to be more fluidity and higher fragmentation now than during the 1990s, and even the role of personalities in these countries seems to have increased recently to the detriment of programmatic parties.
This can be regarded as a tendency at least partly reinforced by the EP elections (Hrbek, 2005, p. 20 In no case have relations between parties radically changed because of diverging views on the EU. But in Slovakia attitudes towards integration deepened the original central divide in the party system, and in the Czech Republic the split on the right wing of the party spectrum and the collaboration of centre-right and leftist parties has been partly based on different views of European unification.
As already pointed out, the most robust impact of the EU on the new accession countries is detectable in Slovakia (see Chapter 8 and Harris, 2004) . Coalition alternatives there, the ideological orientation of the largest party, and even electoral results seem to have been shaped by EU policies. Slovakia can be seen as a vulnerable small country with ambitions of EU membership but whose political structures fell short of EU criteria. Romania also comes close to exemplifying this type. The question is then why EU influence has led to more robust changes in the Slovakian case than in that of Romania. The answer seems to lie in the timing of the encounter with the accession process. The EU required the Me iar-led HZDS to change in face of the possibility of immediate accession, but by the time HZDS was ready to reprofile itself it was too late. By way of contrast, the Iliescu-led Social Democrats in Romania have had more time to transform themselves and were given further incentives to do so by the timing of critical elections.
STANDARDIZATION OF PARTY IDEOLOGIES AND DOMESTIC ROLE OF THE EUROPARTIES
European integration was expected to hasten the decline of idiosyncratic party ideologies and consolidate the dominance of standard European party families (Enyedi, 2005) . Analysis of the CEE countries shows that this expectation, with some notable exceptions, has been met.
Because of the amorphous ideology of many CEE parties, and because of their competition On the basis of individual party profiles, it seems that Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech The presence of Europarties in domestic campaigns is more visible than before, but rarely decisive from the point of view of domestic competition. European legitimacy cannot compensate for the lack of domestic support. In many instances parties that were already well entrenched in a European structure disappeared from the domestic scene. The European
Greens have failed spectacularly to consolidate the position of their CEE allies -support for
Green parties throughout the region declined throughout the accession process.
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN ISSUE
It is possible to detect a slow process of differentiation across parties with regard to the 'European issue', that is attitudes towards the EU. While public Euroscepticism has increased somewhat during the last years, most of the parties that were against EU membership before accession (like the Slovenian National Party or the Hungarian Labour Party) do not now propose withdrawing. In that sense one can even talk about a general softening of party-based Euroscepticism.
There are only a few cases where attitudes towards the EU have led to significant internal tensions within parties. The Czech ODS and the Estonian Centre Party are exceptions in so far as one of the major reasons for internal conflicts and splits in these cases was the Euroscepticism of their leaders. As a result of such tensions there was even a party in the Czech Republic, the European Democrats, whose establishment was based on the attitude it took towards the EU. If this party were to consolidate its position (which is unlikely), it would even be possible to speak about the change in the format of the party system as a result of European issues.
Analysis of CEE party systems shows that many parties have complex attitudes towards the EU. The dichotomies or even four-fold tables that are used in the literature to describe the positions of parties in this respect (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001, 2004) typically shy away from direct opposition to the EU.
In most countries of the region it is still dangerous for a party to be labeled Eurosceptic or an EU non-conformist. Before the accession the accusation of an opponent that a party was endangering integration was (in the countries that have not joined yet, still is) a routinely used political weapon. In those situations where there was very high support for membership and while the country still met with serious obstacles to achieving it (like Romania, Slovakia or Bulgaria) it was very beneficial for parties (and particularly those in opposition) to present themselves as the most pro-European actors: it cost little and brought sympathy both from abroad and from the voters.
There are, however, parties that do not need to bother that much about the general climate of opinion. These are the sectoral parties, more specifically agrarian parties like PSL and Self- On average, and at party level (not at the level of voters!), it is right-wing Euroscepticism that seem to be more robust than that on the left. This conclusion may seem to contradict the recent findings of Garry Marks and his colleagues' (Marks et al. 2006) , who report a positive correlation between left-right and pro-EU attitudes. Note, however, that by left-right they refer to economic policies, and a number of parties exist in the region that are right wing in all respect, save the attitudes on economy. Secondly, they give equal weight to all parties above three percent, while parties obviously affect the party systems to a different degree.
Leftist Euroscepticism is mainly voiced by isolated communist parties, who lack coalition potential. The middle-sized Polish Eurosceptic parties that are often labeled left wing (SelfDefence and PSL) are in fact very far from belonging to the classical left, as seen in their international affiliations.
concerns, and more typically linked with fears of the dominance of foreign businessmen and the purchase of land by foreigners. These concerns are voiced most emphatically by traditionalist right-wing parties (Slovenian National Party, MIÉP, Fidesz, ODS, LPR, PiS), and this gives party-based Euroscepticism a more traditionalist and nationalist face than in the West. The libertarian-authoritarian axis is in most CEE countries a prominent dimension of competition and Euroscepticism is located towards the authoritarian end of that dimension.
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The contrast of between popular and party-based attitudes towards the EU is indicative of the general quality of political representation in the region although -and this point cannot be emphasized enough -this involves an issue that has at best secondary relevance for voters. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) differentiate between four groups of countries: where Euroscepticism is (1) high or (2) low both in public and in the party system, and where there is a greater EU-sceptic orientation (3) in the elite or (4) in the public. The first group comprises Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic and Poland, the second -Bulgaria, the thirdRomania, Slovakia and Hungary, and the fourth -Slovenia and Lithuania 5 . Beichelt (2004) has also analyzed the correspondence between party and mass-based Euroscepticism, labelling the latter two, discrepant groups as 'over' and 'under-mobilized'. His results differ sharply from Taggart and Szczerbiak's, however. He includes Poland and the Czech Republic in the first group, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia and Bulgaria in the second, in the third are placed Slovakia and Romania, and in the fourth Estonia and Latvia.
Our assessment differs from both classifications. It is closer to Beichelt's, but the Czech Republic appears to us more as a case of over-mobilization while in Slovenia Euroscepticism seems to be rather under-mobilized. Qualitative evaluation of party platforms and behaviour also indicate that party-based Euroscepticism in Slovakia and Romania is weaker than implied in Beichelt's grouping.
Judging by the result of the referendums, about one fifth of the public was opposed to EU membership in the respective countries. Since typically less than 20 per cent of Given that citizens generally have an amorphous, though largely positive, orientation towards the EU, parties are free to occupy specific positions on the various issues. As
European integration is often perceived as an elite venture, it is surprising to find parties that are more critical towards the EU than their voters. The explanation may be that these parties 
CONCLUSIONS
Before summarizing our major conclusions, it must be emphasized that many of the phenomena visible today -only two years after the first CEE countries joined the European Union -may be short-lived while other, longer lasting consequences are not yet discernible.
In general we must conclude that in CEE party politics the logic of national competition has overridden other logics, including that of the EU. But the integration process has still shaped party systems in numerous ways. Parties converge, though with significant exceptions, towards the classic European ideological patterns and are rapidly integrating with the European party federations. These European party federations, the Europarties, are the most crucial vehicles of standardization. The claim that parties can survive only if they fit into the party internationals (Ágh, 1998) (Romania, Slovakia) . But the tendency to moderation has been somewhat, though not completely, counterbalanced by instances of radical populist backlash (Poland, Slovakia, perhaps Bulgaria). The nature of the discontent also seems to be changing. Anti-minority nationalist populism turned, in some instances, into economic populism as integration progressed. The communist/anti-communist cleavage also seems to have lost ground, and ethnic parties now find themselves in a pivotal position. But evidence for the role of European integration in inducing these developments is often circumstantial and/or anecdotal. More research is necessary using process tracing and statistical methods but, given the nature of the issue at stake and the complex causality involved, one must treat structured narratives (like the chapters in this volume) as equally valid pieces of evidence.
The introductory chapter raised the question of whether the EU has strengthened or weakened the stability of CEE party systems. On the basis of the chapters presented here it is impossible to give an answer that would apply to all the party systems surveyed. (Enyedi, 2005, p.6) and managed to improve their position. On the bases of such evidence the conclusion must be that European integration has neither consolidated nor destabilized the party systems. between parties on various EU-related policy domains has somewhat increased although, one must hasten to add, integration is still largely a symbolic issue. And it could hardly be otherwise, given that the voters, with the exception of a few specific groups like the peasantry, have similar attitudes. In their case the degree of alienation from the national political systems also seems to be the best predictor of opposition to the EU.
The accession process has infused some degree of cooperation across the board, but there are few signs of an overall decline of polarization. There are probably more coalitional formulae possible today than before in CEE, but party competition has not become less aggressive. In order to make a definitive pronouncement about trends in polarization we would need longitudinal, comparable data on the position of the different parties. But questioning the democratic credentials of a competitor is a tactic still much used in electoral competition.
Participation in European integration may well have increased the distance between elites and citizens (although post-communist politics has always been rather elite-driven) and it may have depoliticized certain issues (where the acquis left little room for autonomous politics) but, in contrast to Western Europe, we cannot in this region speak about a 'hollowing out' (Mair, 2004) of party competition because of the EU.
There are still many areas we know little about. Changes in the relations of parties with business groups and with the government, trends concerning the structure of party finance, and transformation of the general status of parties vis-à-vis other political actors in terms of power relations are all topics that definitely deserve further scrutiny. We know a bit more, but still not very much, about trends in internal organizational matters. The EU seems to have had an impact on the internal norms of some parties as far as gender quotas are considered. Otherwise party organizations have not changed spectacularly, although MEPs have often been given representation in the party leadership. Given that many heavyweight CEE politicians were elected or delegated to Strasbourg and Brussels, it is likely that the European component of the parties will play a larger role in the future than in the West. 6 Whether the integration process has an impact on party systems or on the ideology, organization and civic relations of individual parties is not simply an issue arising from the power of the European Union or the status of the respective party systems. It is rather an outcome of the interaction between the two. It is therefore important to consider the nature of the pressures for change a particular party system is confronted with, and the conditions under which these pressures emerge, at the most intensive period of the accession process.
When a party system has more time to adapt, as it has in the case of Romania (in contrast to Slovakia), the impact will be less concentrated and therefore less visible. But as well as observing abrupt changes in party politics scholars must also be able to detect evolutionary processes of adaptation.
To return to Peter Mair's (2000) proposition concerning the impact of the EU on Western
European party systems, we can share the conclusion that European integration has not shaped the format of CEE party systems, either. But European Union institutions, and
European integration process in general, have been able to strengthen the position of some parties and weaken others. More important, by influencing coalition-making strategies and facilitating the ideological reorientation (mainly towards moderation) of certain parties, it has contributed to changes in the mechanics of party systems.
